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In re Parental Rights as to A.L., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 91 (Nov. 13, 2014)1
FAMILY LAW: PARENTAL RIGHTS
Summary
The Court determined that (1) when seeking to maintain parental rights, parents have a
right to bring material evidence rebutting a NRS 432B.450 presumption that a child is in need of
protection; and (2) that district courts cannot rely on juvenile court findings of intentional abuse
to terminate parental rights where such evidence has been improperly excluded.
Background
In April 2010, a Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) investigator
interviewed appellant Keaundra regarding anonymous allegations of child abuse. In spite of
Keaundra’s assertions that her one-year-old child, C.B., had been accidentally burned on the face
by an iron, DFS filed a petition for protective custody under NRS Chapter 432B, alleging either
physical abuse or negligent supervision.
At an adjudicatory hearing, the hearing master took testimony from a medical examiner
(who opined that C.B.’s injury was inconsistent with an accident), while excluding a rebutting
report from C.B.’s treating physician on the grounds that it was not a certified copy. The hearing
master then recommended sustaining the abuse and neglect petition on the grounds that
Keaundra physically abused C.B. The juvenile court affirmed the recommendation and
concluded that the injury was not accidental.
DFS then petitioned to terminate Keaundra’s parental rights. In spite of Keaundra’s
satisfactory progress at two six-month reviews, DFS continued to maintain its recommendation
to terminate her parental rights because she refused to admit that she had intentionally abused
C.B. Following trial, the district court, relying on the hearing master’s findings and the juvenile
court’s ruling that Keaundra was at fault for C.B.’s injuries, terminated Keaundra’s parental
rights. Keaundra appealed.
Discussion
“A party petitioning to terminate parental rights must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) termination is in the child’s best interest, and (2) parental fault exists.”2 Under
NRS 432B.450, a presumption that a child needs protection is raised when an expert testifies that
injuries would not have occurred but for “negligence or a deliberate but unreasonable act or
failure to act by the person responsible for the welfare of the child.” To rebut this presumption,
the parent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that parental fault does not exist
and termination is not in the child’s best interest.3
Here, Keaudra asserted that the treating physician’s rebutting report was improperly
excluded for not being a certified copy, leading the district court to find abuse without hearing
material evidence intended to rebut the presumption the child needed protection. As DFS did not
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address this argument on appeal, the court concluded that DFS confessed error. The district
court's findings of parental fault which justified termination of Keaundra's parental rights were
all premised on her failure to comply with a portion of her case plan requiring her to admit to
intentionally abusing her child.
Conclusion
Therefore, since the finding of intentional abuse was based on an improper exclusion of
rebutting evidence, the Court reversed the ruling of the district court’s termination order and
remanded the matter for a new trial.

